KIMMO LAPINTIE
yhdyskuntasuunnittelun professori
WEB-JULKAISUT
Argumentation Analysis and Assessment as a Tool in Strategic Planning. Paper delivered at the joint AESOP-WPSC Congress, Shanghai , China 12-15.7.2001
Kimmo Lapintie
Professor of Urban and Regional Planning
Department of Architecture
Helsinki University of Technology
Taina Rajanti
Doctor of Social Sciences
Senior Researcher
Department of Architecture
Helsinki University of Technology
1. Introduction
This paper introduced some results from several research projects carried out in the Helsinki University of Technology, in cooperation with other universities and private research institutes. The themes of the various projects have circulated around a common focus: How to develop planning tools more suited to the new strategic situation that planners are facing at the moment. I am referring to the European and partly global context of new forms of governance, demands for a better quality in communication between different stakeholders, and new environmentalism, including not only policies for sustainability but also a new cultural understanding of nature. One may say that, in light of these challenges, the planning profession has to orient itself towards a more reflexive attitude, since the old practices and arguments are losing their legitimacy. This is true for architect-planners as well as for those with a more policy-oriented background.
In this paper I will first shortly discuss the theoretical underpinnings or these changes, and the new conceptual framework that we have found useful in some of our projects, in particular in GREENSCOM (Communicating Urban Growth and Green). Secondly, I will discuss a particular tool developed for planners, which we call Argumentation Analysis and Assessment (AAA).
Argumentation is an instrument that is - in spite of its clear relevance - not widely and systematically used in planning, as many critical case studies have shown (Lapintie 1996, 1997, 1998). This entails that the argumentative process is often full of common fallacies that make it difficult to utilise the potentials of rational discussion of land-use issues. It is also rather common in both planning theory and practice that argumentation is confused with rhetoric or persuading of the audience. In other fields aiming at rational solutions (such as in academic discourse or in legal proceedings), the consistent application of the rules of argumentation is more common, and the respective research field, argumentation theory, is also much developed since its revitalisation in the 1950s (van Eemeren et al. 1996).
For this reason, a method to apply argumentation in a consistent way in planning has been developed in Helsinki University of Technology, in connection with several large and small research projects (Ecopolis 1993-96, The City and Planning Professions 1996-2001, Consolidation in Urban Compaction 2000-01). The method is still not tested in actual planning processes, but it has been used in post hoc –evaluation of planning documents. It is mainly based on one of the major branches of argumentation theory, the so-called pragma-dialectical theory, which has already been applied in many other fields (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992). The theoretical basis of this method is described in Lapintie (1998).
The method, called Argumentation Analysis and Assessment (AAA) is based on the idea that from argumentation theory, a set of normative-practical requirements for efficient argumentation are developed, and the actual use of argumentation is assessed with respect to these requirements. Naturally, the assessment has to be done by an external observer and analyst, but, as the results are given for the use of the participants in the planning process, this is supposed to contribute to a social learning process and, in the end, it is hoped to lead into better argumentation.
The requirements mentioned are not derived from any idealised communication situation (such as Habermas´ ideal speech situation), but rather from actual practices oriented to resolving differences of opinion. Argumentation is not supposed to lead in consensus in every case (that is why we still need the supreme courts), but fallacious argumentation can be shown to waste the limited resources allocated for communication in situations that are solution-oriented. Planning is certainly one of these situations, since some solution eventually has to be reached; even doing nothing is a planning solution. The objective of developing argumentation is, therefore, to optimise the use of social and communicative resources available for the planning process.
2. The Governance Debate
The word ‘governance' has in recent decade come to mean a new type of political activities that, instead or in addition to formal representative government and its controlling and service-providing functions, strives to build up new types of interaction, partnerships and community activity. According to Stoker (1997, 38), the baseline definition of governance is that it refers to the action, manner or system of governing in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable. It is related to the contemporary situation, where the governing of global or local development can no longer be mastered from the point of view of a sovereign authority (even relative to a restricted area or sector responsibility). That is, governance refers to ‘managing a nobody-in-charge world' (Ibid. 37).
But this baseline definition, according to Stoker, opens the possibilities of two different interpretations, the managerial and the systemic (ibid. 38). The former is related to the adoption of new tools by the formal authorities and the emergence of less radical new processes, whereas the latter refers to new practices, new cooperative ensembles, and the emergence of self-governing networks. This dichotomy corresponds to the multiplicity of theoretical traditions behind the governance debate, and also to the various motives that have given rise to the new formations of governance, such as public-private partnerships.
These are no longer uncommon in urban planning, management and development. For instance, the city of Utrecht in the Netherlands has made up to 850 contracts with non-governmental organisations and even private citizens for the development and maintenance of urban green areas. Similarly, the city of Lahti in Finland is developing its central areas by using real-estate contracts between land-owners, entrepreneurs and the city council. These two examples also reveal the two types of governance used in urban development, namely those where the role of the civil society and the initiatives of local residents are encouraged, and those where the partnership is rather based on the cooperation between those actors who have the access to important economic or political resources. This latter type is also related to the possible emergence of new urban regimes, in the sense defined by Stone (1989), and it also gives rise to the often expressed doubts on accountability in such arrangements (Peters 1997, 30).
The roots of the literature on governance is varied and partly eclectic, ranging from New Public Management (Hood 1991; Rhodes 1995) to Foucault-inspired theories (Miller 1987, Rose & Miller 1992). This will make it difficult to focus our attention to what is new and relevant in this discussion, but, on the other hand, it will enable an in-depth discussion of the political nature of these changes. One of the corollaries of the concept is, namely, that political agency is no longer fixed or well-defined, whether it is related to professional expertise or representatives of the state or municipal authorities. If governance entails borders becoming permeable, it also entails that the usual professional and political strategies of withholding and controlling information, using specific expert-language, and distinguishing the responsibilities and accountability of each actor, no longer hold. This is what is meant when saying that the situation of urban planning and development is no longer in its ‘normal phase', and that this new situation is putting the legitimacy of different actors at stake. Hence the different strategies by various actors and professions to defend the original borders (e.g. Lapintie 1996), as well as more progressive strategies of others to widen and re-justify their role in planning and urban policy (such as ecological planning or the communicative turn in planning).
The complexity of this situation is illustrated in the discussion of political and planning subjectivity and the policy instruments that are used in planning and urban governance. If we use, for instance, Christopher Hoods´s classification of the ‘tools of government' in terms of the acronym NATO (Nodality, Authority, Treasure, and Organisation) (Hood 1986), we can see that the political role of the government is still very much based on its nodal point in the flow of information, its legal basis, its economic resources, and its employees and their dispersion throughout society. These resources are also put to use in new forms of governance, when the city authorities, for instance, give financial resources to community activity, or when they collect and give access to information. It would thus seem that the new forms of governance could be seen as new policy instruments of the local government, necessary or useful because they combine the resources of the public and private sectors (Peters 1997, 21).
The problem with this approach is, however, that by concentrating on the role of government it does not address the original formation and re-formation of political subjectivity. The key role of the public sector and public officials like planners is connected to the understanding of the city and the state as unified agents, ‘the political bodies', and the belief in the possibility to govern the development of a restricted area of concern. This basic understanding, which is inherently connected to the process of modernisation, is analysed by Foucault with the concept of governmentality (Foucault 1979). This means that the basic rationality of governance is not related to the strategic action of specified social groups, but rather to the formation of the social subject, the general interest, and the multitude of technologies for the control and development of the population, that is, bio-power. In this context, the role of planning as a special expertise connected to the welfare state and its strategies and technologies is quite straightforward. What is far from evident, however, is the real challenge that the new forms of governance present to this traditional subjectivity. Is the ‘king finally decapitated', and have ‘welfare of the citizens', ‘functionality of land-use', and ‘good environment' etc. lost their rhetorical power?
3. The Shamanist and Reflexive Conceptions of Planning
It is evident that by keeping his conceptual boxes closed the planner has, during most of the twentieth century, been able to retain much of his or her authority. The physical presence of the planner has been ensured by his social role as the interpreter of the good environment and the synthetic general interest. Planning practice, as a mystical way of access to this general interest, has, thus, been the central legitimising basis of the planning profession. It is thus no wonder that the profession hesitates to open the central concepts, the boxes, in the fear that they would be found empty.
An important corollary of this ‘shamanist' conception of planning is that the planner has detached himself from both the political and the public debate. Planners consistently present themselves as a-political: they are careful not to present any political statements, even if planning is often clearly connected to the welfare-state and even, as in the Nordic countries, to political movements such as social democracy. At the same time they often see political short-sightedness and bargaining as a major threat to the quality of the environment.
Similarly, this traditional planning expertise is not considered to gain much from the civil society or citizen participation, although these are not necessarily found suspect in the same sense as local politics. This is because traditional planning practice is seen to be essentially substantive , and participation, political debate, bureaucratic processing are all, in contrast, seen to be procedural . Since citizen participation or judicial deliberation cannot replace “planning itself”, they only spend the already scarce resources allocated for the whole endeavour. Despite the additional local knowledge gained by communicating with the citizens, the “laymen”, the traditional planner feels that he or she is still alone responsible for the ethical and aesthetic quality of the resulting built environment or its deterioration. The introduction of communication and participation as more and more crucial elements of contemporary planning, which seems to be happening all around Europe and even globally, will thus be received with suspicion and frustration by the traditional planner.
The shamanist conception of planning is well rooted in both professional ethics and traditional trust in expertise. It is also consistent, but it seems to have difficulties in maintaining its legitimacy in the changing cultural, social, and political environment. Although critical towards both representative politics and civil society, planners are not able to give alternatives: They do not turn their critical eye towards their own key concepts.
This inability to be reflexive does not only concern practitioners but planning theory as well. In the same sense as practitioners seem to have difficulties in confronting with the politicians and the citizens, planning theory seems to be unbalanced when trying to contextualise planning practice and the planning professions in the wider social and political environment. An illustrative example is Bent Flyvbjerg´s famous analysis of the local politics around the planning of Aalborg (Flyvbjerg 1998). Flyvbjerg managed to detect brilliantly the power relations and local regimes that determined the actual implementation of the so-called Aalborg project, but he was clearly unable to use the same armature against planning as a social and political activity. As a result, planners appeared to be politically weak (as compared to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce for instance), but still inherently rational and benevolent, devoid of any self-interest. They would have known how to develop Aalborg into a better urban environment, if only they had been listened to. But they were not, since “rationality yielded to power.” It is no wonder then that, although mentioning both Nietzsche and Foucault as his theoretical roots, Flyvbjerg never really addressed the basic Foucaultian conception of productive power, where planners are clearly among the producers.
It is only by seeing planners as a profession that is socially and politically embedded in the modern society that the changing role of planning and its future options could be addressed. However, from the point of view of planning theory, the detatchment typical of the sociology of professions is not quite appropriate for our present purposes. Reflexivity in planning does not mean sociology of planning, but rather a conscious effort to address the issue of professional knowledge and expertise and the respective professional power in the actual political context.
4. Actors, Actants, and Agencies
Now I would like to introduce a couple of concepts that we found useful in the theoretical part of the Greenscom project. The conceptual framework was the result of intensive discussion among the Finnish team (in addition to myself, Dr. Taina Rajanti and architect Olli Maijala) using the comments by the other teams in the project.
Connected to the question of the field of action defined by the use of a policy instrument is the question of who are the actors involved in the use of the policy instrument, who are the actors constituting this specific policy network. Here we have to give some thought to what we really mean by “actors”. “Actor” and “agency” are sociological concepts, often used synonymously, to refer to the fact that even if society consists of structures that form and influence human beings and their action, these structures are realised, kept in action, and changed through the action of concrete actors. ( Meyer & Jepperson 2000)
According to Meyer and Jepperson there is a vague agreement but no fixed meaning for the two terms. We have exploited this to define for the purposes of our research:
• agencies ; which are properties of the policy network and the planning and communication tools, contained in them as possibilities for specific actor to realise.
• actors ; which are concrete persons or groups that realise the agencies in practice.
• actants ; which in the policy network and its practice are present only represented by a spokesperson or spokespersons, i.e. by one or more of the actors.
Of these, actor is a concept whose meaning is more or less evident: we are looking at planning situations and planning processes, and we want to know who are the actors in these processes. We have also a list of the most relevant possible communication situations in a planning process, and consequently a list of the most relevant possible actors in a policy network of a planning process:
Researchers and other experts: these are researchers and experts of different disciplines and sectors who produce knowledge pertinent to their field of expertise. Researchers and other experts can be either directly engaged in a specific process, or have an indirect impact on it through their discourse.
Planners : here it is important to note that in a European perspective planners have different backgrounds as architects, urban designers, town planners, landscape architects, civil engineers, and human geographers etc. They are educated and trained in different traditions and they work within different sectors
such as land-use planning, transport planning, green planning etc. Furthermore, they work at different levels of government (European, national, regional, local) and in different scales (structural or detailed).
Interest groups : these are to a degree organised groups that have various forms and aims. They can be groups of local residents, or environmentalists, or environmentalists that are members of national or international organisations, etc. Interest groups are groups that explicitly express an interest concerning some aspect of the object of a planning process.
Users: The users of urban areas constitute a broad and diverse group of public and private organisations, businesses, and citizens with different values, intentions, culture and resources. Their common connection is the urban area where they work or live that is a shared place for their everyday actions.
Developers : Also developers can be different as to size and scope of their intentions, some are small firms acting on a local basis, some representatives of big international firms acting in global market. Their common business idea is still making money on building and construction work. Developers of quite another type are private or public organisations that want to invest in the local situation in order to improve the conditions for their businesses or everyday life.
Politicians : Politicians belong to different parties and their worldviews and value varies accordingly. They work on different levels of government and have missions within different policy areas. Furthermore, they represent different groups of citizens.
Besides actors , the policy network of a planning process has also actants . Actants are persons or groups of persons (or things) that figure in the process through a spokesman who is representing them. The concept is borrowed from Bruno Latour, who uses it with reference to things represented in science by scientists, be they persons or groups of persons like Samoan natives, or things like micro-organisms. An anthropologist is a spokesman for Samoan natives, describing their life and defining their customs. In their everyday-life Samoan natives are actors, but in the anthropological books they have only the role of actants.
This concept is useful when we want to understand the workings of the policy network of a planning process. Instead of just looking at the actors who take an active part in the process it will make it able to look at those possible relevant actors who do not, but who instead appear in the process as actants, represented by some spokesman. For instance it is normal procedure for the planners to plan for users, and the users usually appear in the plans and planning documents, even if no user takes an active part in the planning process. Planners are thus acting as spokesmen for actant users.
We shall use this concept also to refer to other items that appear in the process as actants. The most important one is the “green” or nature itself. To apply the concept of actant to urban green is quite consistent with the use Latour makes of the concept. When urban green is being planned, or when it is being researched and discussed by researchers and other experts it is an actant represented by spokesmen. We want to extend this representation also to representations given to urban green by all of the possible relevant actors. We can then discuss what role is given to green by different actors, who is acting as a spokesman of urban green, and what is the spokesman saying about it.
Actant green is a concept that refers to the fact that urban green appears in the policy network of a planning process only represented by a spokesman or spokesmen. It also refers to the fact that despite this, “urban green” or nature has an existence of its own. The concept of actant green could even be developed into a planning concept that would make the actors of a planning process sensible to their active role in defining nature, and to the fact that nature cannot be reduced to its representations in the planning process. It can also make the actors sensible to the different roles given to actant green by different actors, and in comparative perspective in different cultural contexts.
Agency we have defined to be property of the policy network and the planning and communication tools, contained in them as possibilities for specific actor to realise. We need this concept because we are interested in developing sustainable planning tools that make it possible for a wider range of actors to take part in the planning process. A new instrument does not necessarily contain new agencies: if the dentist acquires a new drill, this does not give the patient any new agency, as his part in the cure is to keep his mouth open so that the dentist can use the drill. Instead, if the dentist introduces the instrument of “patient discussion”, this does give the patient a new agency since now he opens his mouth also to take part in a discussion. The concept of agency makes it possible to evaluate if a planning tool is constituted so that it is possible for different actors to take part in the process, or if a tool makes this impossible from the beginning.
We can also note that in a relation, and more so in a network, a new agency alters the agency of all involved. The dentist instead of just using his technical instruments also has to learn to open his mouth and listen to his patient, to regard the patient as a whole person, not a set of teeth; and to see that the reception is not just about the doctor performing operations but about the meeting of two parties. Likewise communicative policy instruments in a planning process introduce agencies for new actors, such as interest groups, users, developers, but also give the planner a new agency: he has to take into account the other actors as actors, not as actants represented by his professional expert knowledge.
We are also interested in discovering to what degree, under which circumstances and how the possibility of an agency is realised, or if the possibility is not realised. Agencies can only be realised in the practical planning process, as the tool is being used. If new agencies are realised then we can speak of tools in transition : also the realisation of new agencies reframes the whole planning process and the communication situations in it (Birgersson & Malbert & Strömberg 2001). Realising new agencies are thus characteristics of tools in transition.
We can thus recognise following possibilities:
• A policy instrument does not contain new agencies. Consecutively there are no new actors.
• A policy instrument contains new agencies.
• Agencies are realised.
• Agencies are realised partially
• new actors enter planning processes, but the relation between planner and other actors remains top-down.
• there are new agencies for all actors, but the process is used only for legitimating decisions made elsewhere.
• agencies are realised asymmetrically, only some actors are included in the process, which produces exclusion and disempowerment.
• Agencies are not realised
• all new agencies are more or less explicitly rejected: there is no will to realise them.
• there is not sufficient expertise to realise new agencies.
A tool can have a different meaning for each group of actors, because their objectives for participating in the planning process are different; and their objectives are different because their practices that give them their basis for participating in the planning process are different. We can take as an example the improvement of a park by involving near-by residents: the planner's objective is to improve a green area, possibly as part of a green-structure plan. The resident's objective on the other hand may be that he/she happens to like gardening and can now realise his/her need for it, or he/she is an environmentalist who wants to improve the quality of green, or he/she wants an activity for doing something together with his/her children or other people in general etc.
The meaning a tool has for an actor or a group of actors depends on their practice and the field of action they can identify with. The meaning of the interactive tool of “improving a green area by involving residents” for the planner is to improve the green area; for the resident it can be doing gardening, improving green, or spending time with others. The field of action of the tool for the planner is implementing a plan and completing a planning process of improving a green area, as this is the practice of the planner. The field of action for the various residents has to do with their practices. Each actor evaluates the meaning and successfulness of a policy instrument according to the field of action he recognises primary , and according to the agency in which he/it/they identify themselves with: if the plan was implemented and the area improved, or if the gardening is meaningful and rewarding, if the company and the time spent together is pleasant.
5. The Types of Planning Instruments
We have chosen to divide the existing and possible instruments in planning into two subgroups, structural and interactive instruments. The reason for this is that there are clearly instruments (such as various types of Green Structure Plans and green networks) that are directly related to conceptualising the urban fabric as a planning object, on the one hand, and other instruments (such as argumentation, rhetoric, organisational and inter-organisational learning), that are rather related to the development of the planning process, and which can be used in detailed and fragmented cases, as well as in structural or comprehensive cases of planning. The two groups are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that structural instruments could not include interactive parts, or vice versa, but they are not logically related either. Thus the use of interactive instruments as part and parcel of structural instruments, for instance, is a contingent matter that has to be studied in each case separately. We may ask, however, the general question whether certain types of instruments have an inherent tendency to include or exclude certain other instruments.
Our use of the terms structural and interactive is, in this context, operational. That is, we do not mean to include all of the meanings and connotations usually connected to these concepts. First of all, we do not treat them as normative concepts. Thus structural instruments are not necessarily top-down, authoritative, or expert-oriented instruments, and interactive instruments are not necessarily democratic, inclusive, or bottom-up instruments. The normative principles which we have been committed to (e.g. inclusion and empowerment), have to be considered separately in each case, and they cannot be entailed from the types of the instruments. This is all the more important since contemporary social theory has demonstrated the inapplicability of clear dichotomies between command-and-control policies on the one hand and interactive policies on the other. One of the basic means of control in the modern society is, namely, interaction and participation.
Our use of the terms structural and interactive is also operational in another sense. These concepts can and have been given very general meanings in scientific and public discourse: Almost anything can be said to have a structure, and in all forms of social activity, some kind of interaction occurs. In this context, we are not referring to these general meanings, but relate these concepts directly to the historical and current situation of planning and urban governance.
By structural instruments we mean planning concepts and conceptual constructions that, instead of addressing individual buildings, parks, forest and lakes, construct them into an interdependent whole, where the individual parts are connected through a set of relations (such as accessibility by humans or animals, closeness, functional interaction, etc.). In some cases the term structural is also given a more demanding interpretation, in the sense that the whole of the individual parts and relations is taken to function as the sustaining structure for certain qualities (e.g. air quality, biodiversity, perceived variety) or activities (recreation, dwelling). It can also be constructed to create conditions for new qualities and activities (Tjallingii 1996, 149). Structural instruments dealing with urban growth and green already have a long history: Olmsted's work in Boston in the 1880s, Leberecht Migge´s work in Frankfurt in the 1920s, London 's Greenbelt in the 1940s, and the Dutch Green Heart in the 1960s. Copenhagen´s finger plan and its various application all over Europe , also in Finland , provide another example. Usually, comprehensive plans in their various forms include some kind of structural green element in addition to the corresponding “red” structures, such as traffic, housing or services. But the rise of ecology and sustainability to the European political agenda have given these instruments a new and refined meaning, and some cities have been provided with special green or green structure plans.
By interactive instruments we mean instruments that (as compared to previous professional practices and forms of urban governance) open up new agencies in the process of planning and governing urban growth and green areas. By “agency” we mean a structural or systemic position of an agent, a place that can be “filled” by an actor. Usually, in interactive instruments, actors are not supposed to do whatever they please, but their role is determined in relation to the respective roles of planners and other experts, politicians and bureaucrats. There are various ways in which these agencies can be defined and governed. Often the roles of different actors in the planning process are determined also by building and planning legislation. For instance, in the new Planning and Building Act in Finland, land-owners, residents, relevant public officers, and the non-governmental organisations whose field of activity is concerned, are given the status of “stakeholder” (osallinen), and they are given specific rights in the planning process that are different from outsiders. For instance, they have to be given the opportunity to express their opinion and, if they so demand, the city (and in practice the planner) has the obligation to give them an answer based on an argument. In the case of conflict, this argument is assessed by the Supreme Administrative Court .
What is interesting in interactive instruments is that, even if they do not necessarily lead to inclusion or empowerment, they open up new possibilities for new actors. Even if the role of new actors is often limited and determined, the basic open-ended situation that is usually the prerequisite of any interaction will eventually help new practices and new ways of dealing with conflicting interests to emerge. But before drawing too quick conclusions concerning the processes of inclusion and empowerment in these situations, the complex role of urban agency and participation should be further analysed. We cannot start from the assumption that the growth of participation in planning is simply the result of a growing understanding of the needs of citizens to get involved in the planning of their environment.
6. Argumentation Analysis and Assessment
Argumentation itself is an interactive instrument that is not widely and systematically used in planning, as many critical case studies have shown (Lapintie 1996, 1997, 1998a). This entails that the argumentative process is often full of common fallacies that make it difficult to utilise the potentials of rational discussion of land-use issues. It is also rather common in both planning theory and practice that argumentation is confused with rhetoric or persuading the audience. In other fields aiming at rational solutions (such as in academic discourse or in legal proceedings), the consistent application of the rules of argumentation is more common, and the respective research field, argumentation theory, is also much developed since its revitalisation in the 1950s (van Eemeren et al. 1996).
For this reason, a method to apply argumentation in a consistent way in planning has been developed in Helsinki University of Technology, in connection with several larger and smaller research projects (Ecopolis 1993-96, The City and Planning Professions 1996-2001, Consolidation in Urban Compaction 2000-01). The method is still not tested in actual planning processes, but it is mainly based on one of the major branches of argumentation theory, the so-called pragma-dialectical theory, which has already been applied in many other fields (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992). The theoretical basis of this method is described in Lapintie (1998a).
The method, called Argumentation Analysis and Assessment (AAA) is based on the idea that from argumentation theory, a set of normative-practical requirements for efficient argumentation are developed, and the actual use of argumentation is assessed with respect to these requirements. Naturally, the assessment has to be done by an external observer and analyst, but, as the results are given for the use of the participants in the planning process, this is supposed to contribute to a social learning process and, in the end, it is hoped to lead into better argumentation. The requirements mentioned are not derived from any idealised communication situation (such as Habermas´ ideal speech situation), but rather from actual practices oriented to resolving differences of opinion. Argumentation is not supposed to lead in consensus in every case (that is why we still need the Supreme Courts), but fallacious argumentation can be shown to waste the limited resources allocated for communication in situations that are solution-oriented. Planning is certainly one of these situations, since some solution eventually has to be reached; even doing nothing is a planning solution. The objective of developing argumentation is, therefore, to optimise the use of social and communicative resources available for the planning process .
The basic requirements for rational argumentation are the following: (1) Proponents of standpoints are required to justify their standpoints by putting forward arguments, especially if there are relevant alternatives, and if the proponents are challenged by opponents, (2) these arguments, as well as the original standpoints, can be openly challenged, if they are not generally acceptable, or if there is a specific reason to this (reasonable doubt), (3) proponents of standpoints should withdraw from their standpoints or their challenging, or modify them, if they cannot be supported by acceptable arguments. In other words, the options discussed should be defended, and critical and open discussion should be allowed, but the parties should see the situation as open-ended, in the sense that they are ready to withdraw from their position if it cannot be defended. Simply “refusing to listen to reason” will not do. The motivation for these requirements is that this is the only way to have all relevant options and their pros and cons on the table. Similarly, this will make it possible to get all perspectives and interests on the agenda.
The arguments that are put forward to support a standpoint should, secondly, be based on a generally acceptable argumentation scheme . The most common of these are (a) argument from an acceptable and relevant authoritative source (such as scientific research or other reliable source), (b) argument from analogy (comparing the situation with relevantly similar cases in other fields), and (c) argument from universality (universalisability argument), for instance by comparing the situation with practices or principles applied generally. For instance, a participant defending a specific green area in the city may refer, for instance, (a) to research results showing the positive effects of the urban green to human health, (b) to the idea the green areas are “the lungs of the city”, or (c) to the fact that the area concerned already has much less green than the other similar parts of the city. On the other hand, if she is only saying that she would like the area preserved, she is not yet putting forward an argument, but only expressing her opinion (which is not to say that opinions should not matter, but that they are not yet arguments).
Thirdly, the participants in the argumentative process should avoid using fallacies . Fallacies (or “would-be-arguments”) are communicative acts that are sometimes rhetorically successful, but which are either irrelevant or even misleading as arguments. There are a number of fallacies that have been analysed and discussed in argumentation theory since the classical times, including, for instance: (i) the straw man , i.e. misreading or distorting the other's argument and attacking against this “straw man”, (ii) argumentum ad hominem , i.e. attacking the person instead of his argument, (iii) argumentum verecundiam , i.e. using an irrelevant authority or an authority not generally acceptable, (iv) argumentum ad baculum , i.e. threatening the other party not to present his standpoint or challenge an argument, (v) petitio principii , or circular reasoning, i.e. giving an argument that assumes the standpoint that is supposed to be defended.
It is easy to demonstrate, in each of these cases, that the use of fallacies does not contribute to the optimisation of the use of communicative resources in a solution-oriented process. For instance, if a straw man is used by an opponent, it is usually totally irrelevant to the actual standpoint defended by the proponent. Thus it will at least require an additional communicative act from him (demonstrating that this is not what he meant) or, at worst, it may mislead the other participants to conclude that the original standpoint has been shown false.
The AAA as an instrument will thus contribute to social sustainability , since it will present normative criteria for inclusionary argumentation suggested by most theorist of communicative planning (e.g. Healey 1997). However, since argumentation is a special communicative skill not evenly distributed among stakeholders, it can also be used to silence those of the participants who are not well provided for, or who do not have the financial resources to use representatives (“advocats”). Outside observers and analysts, on the other hand, have to be commissioned and paid for by one of the participants, usually the city authorities, which may question their objectivity. The use of AAA will thus require a shared motivation to develop planning argumentation (for instance to avoid legal procedures), if it is applied on a voluntary basis.
AAA will also contribute to communicative sustainability , since it will clearly develop the quality of planning argumentation and (in the long run) the efficient use of the limited resources of planning communication. However, since this is based on rationalisation of communication, it can contribute to the exclusion of less rational (emotional, creative, interpretative) forms and styles of communication.
The contribution of AAA to ecological sustainability is also evident, since planning solutions will be defended and challenged by using also ecological arguments. It will be less easy for planners and decision makers simply to avoid ecological arguments, if they do not support their view. Vague arguments (“cars will have to be allowed in city centres in order to preserve the economic viability of the city”) will probably be challenged in planning discourse. Ecological expertise, as well as other forms of expertise, are also given their due respect in argumentation, in comparison to free flow of opinions. However, since arguments are hardly ever conclusive, unsustainable solutions can also be argued for (“scientists are not unanimous about global warming, so we should not risk the competitiveness of our economy by reducing CO 2 -emissions”, “green fingers will create more traffic and emissions”).
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